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FOR A MESS OF POTAGE: THE GST'S
PROMISE OF INCREASED REVENUE
TO STATES COMES AT THE COST
OF THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE
OF THE CONSTITUTION
-Alok

Prasanna Kumar'

Abstract The Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016
which provides a framework for the levy of Goods and Services
Tax in India has re-cast India's federal structure in a manner that is fundamentally damaging to the basic structure of
the Constitution of India. It has made the States' fiscal policies subject to the control and veto of the Union Government
in the GST Council. It has also not given aggrieved States any
effective remedy against the decisions of the GST Council, as
the dispute settlement mechanism will be constituted by the
very GST Council against which a State has a grievance. When
challenged in court, the 101st Amendment Act might not withstand scrutiny on grounds of violating the basic structure of the
Constitution of India.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution (101t Amendment) Act, 2016, ("the 101st Amendment Act")
is a radical re-structuring of the constitutional basis for taxation by the Union
and State Governments in India. Enacted to create a constitutional framework to
introduce the Goods and Services Tax (GST), the 101st Amendment Act grants
new powers to the Union Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies, and also
creates institutions that have a significant bearing on the federal character of the
Constitution.

The author is an advocate at the High Court of Karnataka.
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The Constitution, as it was when initially brought into force, had a particular
vision in respect of taxation of goods and services supplied within India; while
customs duty and excise on manufacture were within the scope of the legislative powers of the Union Parliament, 2 taxation of sale and movement of goods
was within the exclusive purview of the States.3 The demarcation of Union and
State taxing powers in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule was precise and
clear, leaving little room for any overlap in the kind of taxes that the Union could
impose and those that a State could impose. List III or the "Concurrent List" contains no taxing entries, suggesting that the constitutional scheme of taxation was
to allot two separate, exclusive spheres of taxation for the Union and the States. 4
That States should have independent taxing powers is a necessary feature of a
federal polity, and mere plenary legislative power, in the absence of the power to
impose taxes and raise revenue, would be meaningless.
With the coming into force of the GST regime, both the Union and the States
will ostensibly have the power to tax the supply of goods and services. The 101st
Amendment Act takes away neither the Union's nor the States' taxing power but
instead gives them the power to impose taxes on supply of goods and supply of
services respectively.
This is a fundamental change from the earlier, exclusive spheres of taxation
reserved for the Union and the States under the constitutional scheme. This
change has implications for the federal character of India's polity that must be
examined in some depth. More so in light of the fact that the federal character of
the Constitution of India has been held to be a basic feature of the Constitution
of India by the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India,6 and therefore
cannot be abrogated by a constitutional amendment.
I argue in this paper that the 101st Amendment Act fundamentally upsets the
federal structure of the Constitution, and therefore is an abrogation of the basic
structure of the Constitution. I say this for two reasons: one, the GST Council
2

3
4

5

6

CONST. Entries 83 and 84, List I, Seventh Schedule. No separate entry for Service Tax
existed in the Constitution at the time it was enacted. Though the Supreme Court in TN.
Kalyana Mandapam Assn. v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 632 held that such service tax as a
subject matter was within the "residuary power" of the Union, Entry 92C was introduced into
List I by the Constitution (88th Amendment) Act, 2004 to clarify that the Union had the exclusive
power to impose a service tax.
INDIA CONST. Entries 54 and 52, List II, Seventh Schedule.
This is not to say that the Union and the State can never tax the same subject matter or transaction. The Supreme Court's judgments following Federationof Hotel & RestaurantAssn. of India
v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 634 allow the State and the Centre to tax the same subject matter but different "aspects" of it. Whether or not the aspect theory has any place in Indian constitutional law, given the clear division of powers between Union and the States is also a matter to
be examined, but outside the scope of this paper.
Nirvikar Singh, Fiscal Federalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 521,
521 (Sujit Choudhary, Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds.).
See S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
INDIA
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makes States subordinate to the Union in matters of taxation when they have
never been in such a position under the Constitution and; two, a State aggrieved
by the decisions of the GST Council has no effective legal remedy. I argue therefore, that the structure of the GST Council is a violation of the basic structure of
the Constitution, and could therefore be struck down by the Supreme Court when
challenged.
In order to expand upon the above argument, this paper is divided into three
parts.
The first part will examine the concept of federalism as enshrined in the
Constitution of India and the aspects of it which constitute a "basic feature" of
the Constitution. In doing so, this part will refer to the history of federalism in
India, theories of what federalism is, and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
(which heavily examines the Constituent Assembly debates to arrive at its conclusions) to distil certain core elements of federalism as a basic feature of the
Constitution.
The second part will be an analysis of the 101st Amendment Act and its features, pointing out how it violates the principles of federalism discussed in the
previous part. In doing so, this part will compare the 101st Amendment Act with
its previous iterations to point out what has changed and why these changes
affect the constitutional validity of the 101st Amendment Act. Further, this section
will also briefly mention how countries with a federal Constitution, which have
implemented a GST, namely Australia and Canada, did so within their federal
framework.
The final part will be a summary of the arguments presented, and the possible
consequences of the 101st Amendment Act as it stands.
The focus of this paper is purely doctrinal, focussing specifically on the institutional design of the Goods and Service Tax Council (GST Council) and the
dispute resolution mechanism contained within it; whether it meets the "basic
structure" test laid down by the Supreme Court and what possible difficulties
in implementation are likely to arise in light of its structure. This paper is not
concerned with the fiscal wisdom of a GST in India or whether a GST per se
violates the Constitution. There are numerous practical difficulties in the implementation of the GST which other authors have highlighted,' but these are beyond
the scope of this paper. This paper is also not intended to be a comparative study
of the GST as implemented in other countries.

See M.G Rao, Goods and Services Tax: A Gorilla, Chimpanzee or a Genus like 'Primates'?Vol.
XLVI No. 7 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY 43 (2011). See also Satish S and Kartik Dedhia,

The Challenges of Implementing GST, FORBES INDIA (Feb. 26, 2016)http://forbesindia.com/article/
budget-2016/the-challenges-of-implementing-gst/42491/1.
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II. FEDERALISM AS A BASIC FEATURE
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
A. Historical antecedents
The roots of the Indian Constitution's federal character lie in the Government
of India Act, 1919 and the subsequent Government of India Act, 1935.8 The
Government of India Act, 1935 first introduced the concept of separate legislative
powers for the "Centre" and the "Provinces", with a Federal Court empowered
to adjudicate any disputes arising out of situations in which the Centre or the
Provinces exceed their powers.9 The Constitution of India, far from discarding
this structure, builds upon it, re-distributing powers to some extent, arguably giving greater autonomy to the sub-national units and finding more equitable ways
of distributing revenue between the national and sub-national units.
As far as taxation is concerned, the actual list of subjects of taxation reserved
for States is remarkably similar to the Government of India Act, 1935. The 13
taxing entries in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act,
1935 are reproduced without much change in List II of the Seventh Schedule of
the Constitution of India. The only additional subjects under which States could
levy taxes under the Constitution are: taxes on mineral rights, taxes on consumption and sale of electricity, and taxes on vehicles.
B. Is the Indian Constitution federal in character?
The Constitution of India describes India as a Union of States.0 Even though
the Constitution allows for the creation of new States, renaming existing States,
and alteration of boundaries of States by Parliament through a regular law, the
States themselves are indestructible." The Union Parliament can, through a constitutional amendment, also remove a State from the list of States and merge it
with another, such as for instance States such as the Punjab and Erstwhile Patiala
States Union (PEPSU) which has now been merged into Punjab. 2 New States
have been carved out several times over the years on a linguistic basis (such as
Karnataka) or for better representation of tribal peoples (such as Jharkhand).
The Centre appoints Governors to States and has the power to dismiss State
Governments under Article 356 on the recommendations of the Governor - a
much used and abused power. When Emergency is declared in India, Article 250
permits Parliament to even legislate on subjects earmarked for the States. Under
Article 254, where there is any conflict between a Union law and State law made
See generally Rohit De, Constitutional Antecedents, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN

26-9 (Sujit Choudhary, Madhav Khosla, & Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds.).
Section 204, Government of India Act, 1935.
0 INDIA. CONST. art. I cl. 1.
INDIA. CONST. art. 3.
1
States Reorganisation Act, 1956.
CONSTITUTION
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on the same subject matter in the Concurrent List, the Union law will prevail. All
of these cast doubt on the claim that the Indian Constitution enshrines the principles of federalism.
Does this necessarily mean that we cannot describe India as a "federal" country? Given the greater tilt towards the Union, there has been a serious debate in
the years after the Constitution came into force as to whether India is a federal
polity at all. 3 Decades of actually working the Constitution, not to mention the
judgments of the Supreme Court, have meant that the present common consensus
is that India is a federal country, but one where the Union has a greater share of
the powers than the States." A federal state is not an abstract ideal nor just the
opposite of a unitary state - it is any polity where there is a division of legislative
and executive powers (or political sovereignty) between the national and sub-national units."
A federal division of powers can lie on a spectrum ranging from purely unitary states, such as England to federal States, such as the United States where
the bulk of legislative powers vests with the States. Merely because certain powers can be exercised in exceptional situations, does not mean that a polity ceases
being "federal" conceptually. 6
The common consensus that India's Constitution is federal in character cannot
be dismissed. Some features of India's federalism are undeniable:
a. The States have plenary legislative power derived from the Constitution
and not from a law made by the Union Parliament. 7
b. The States have their own fields of legislation and a common one with the
Union.'
c. The States have the constitutional power to levy tax and raise revenue for
their functioning."
d. The Constitution guarantees the States freedom to spend their revenue as
they see fit. 20
e. The States' executive powers are plenary. 21

13
14

15
16

o

For a summary of this debate, see M.P. Singh, The Federal Scheme, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 464-6 (Sujit Choudhary, Manav Khosla, & Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds.).
Id.
Singh, supra note 13, at 464-6.
Singh, supra note 13, at 464-6.
See Maharaj Umeg Singh v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 540 : (1955) 2 SCR 164.

OF

* INDIA. CONST. art. 246. cl. 2 & 3. INDIA. CONST. List II & III, Seventh Schedule.

Entries 45-63, List II of Seventh Schedule delineate the subject matters on which

19

INDIA. CONST.

2

the State has the power to levy taxes on.
INDIA. CONST. art. 202.
See N.K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1977) 1 SCC 308.
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C. The concept of the basic structure doctrine and federalism as part
of the basic structure
The federal character of the Constitution being a basic feature of the
Constitution of India was hinted at by the Supreme Court in Kesavananda
Rharati v. State of Kerala,22 where the Supreme Court first articulated what came
to be known as the "basic structure doctrine". While holding that constitutional
amendments could be struck down by the Supreme Court for violating the basic
features of the Constitution, the majority in Kesavananda Rharati also enumerated the features of the Constitution that they considered "basic" without exactly
going into depth as to what they meant by each of these features. Of the majority
in this case, CJI Sikri,23 Shelat Grover,24 and Jaganmohan Reddy JJ.,25 explicitly
identify the "federal character" of the Constitution as one of the basic features of
the Constitution. The others in the majority, H.R. Khanna, K.S. Hegde and AK
Mukherjea JJ.,2 6 do not mention it explicitly but concede that the basic features
enumerated by them are not exhaustive and can be expanded upon. The controversial "View by the majority" which nine of the thirteen judges signed on to as
the definitive summary of the main findings of the case also does not list out the
features which are considered to be part of the "basic feature or framework" of
the Constitution.27
While the basic structure doctrine was accepted as law by the Supreme
Court in its subsequent judgment in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain,28 there
was some scepticism about its scope. On the question as to whether the "basic
structure doctrine" could be applied in a context outside the amendment of the
Constitution, in State of Karnataka v. Union of India,29 a seven judge bench of
the Supreme Court of India while dealing with a dispute between the Congressled Government in Karnataka and Janata Party led Union Government, doubted
whether the basic structure doctrine could be used to strike down regular
Government decisions or to interpret the Constitution in a particular manner.30
Holding that a Commission of Inquiry headed by former Supreme Court Judge
appointed by the Union Government to inquire into allegations against the Chief

22

See KesavanandaBharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.

23
24

See Kesavananda, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 366 (Sikri, J.).
See Kesavananda, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (Shelat & Grover, JJ.).
See Kesavananda, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (Reddy, J.).
See Kesavananda, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (Hegde & Mukherjea, JJ.).
Full text of the "View of the majority" is extracted in T.R Andhyarujina,

25
26
27

THE KESAVANANDA

BHARATI CASE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY BY SUPREME COURT AND PARLIAMENT

51 (Universal Law Publishing, 2011). Scholars have debated the legal validity of this "view of the
majority" and until, Andhyarujina's book was published, no authoritative copy of it even existed
in the public domain as the leading law reports which published the Kesavananda Bharati judgment had either not reproduced it at all or had done so incorrectly. See Id., at 51-8.
29

See Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) Supp SCC 1.
See State ofKarnataka v. Union ofIndia, (1977) 4 SCC 608.

30

See State of Karnataka, (1977) 4 SCC 608, 673 (Beg, CJI).

2
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Minister of Karnataka, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge based on the
ground that this was contrary to the basic structure of the Constitution.
Likewise, when the power of the President was used to invoke Article 356
on the ground that the Congress ruled State Governments had "lost legitimacy"
in light of electoral reverses, in 1977, the Supreme Court refused to review the
imposition of such President's Rule through its judgment in State of Rajasthan
v. Union of India.3 ' Although an argument was raised that the policy to dismiss
State Governments was contrary to the basic structure of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court did not think so, and held that it was perfectly acceptable within
the framework of the Constitution. 32 In fact, CJI Beg's judgment seems sceptical
about the whole notion of India's constitution being federal, pointing out the high
level of "control" that the Union tends to exercise over the States. 33
D. Bommai and federalism as basic structure
The Supreme Court in Bommai dispelled scepticism on both fronts - it
asserted that the federal character of the Constitution was a basic feature of the
Constitution and that it could be used in contexts beyond testing the constitutional validity of amendments. The case came to court following the dismissal
of six State Governments by the Union Government in the late 80s and early
90s. 3 4 These dismissals were challenged by the respective States in court and the
cases eventually worked their way up to the Supreme Court and were ultimately
decided in 1994. A nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the State
of Rajasthan case had been decided wrongly, holding that the decision of the
President to impose "President's Rule" on a State could be judicially reviewed
and listed out the narrow grounds on which President's Rule could be imposed.
It therefore held the imposition of President's Rule invalid in the context of three
States, but it also upheld the dismissal of three State Governments on the ground
that their actions in helping kar sevaks was an abrogation of secularism; also a
basic feature of the Constitution.3 5
Six opinions were delivered between the nine judges 36 who heard the Bommai
case of which at least three went into some depth in examining the federal
31

See State ofRajasthan v. Union ofIndia, (1977) 3 SCC 592.

32

See State of Rajasthan, (1977) 3 SCC 592, 620-624 (Beg, CJJ).
See State of Rajasthan (1977) 3 SCC 592, 623 (Beg, CJI).
These states were Karnataka, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal
Pradesh. The first three had been dismissed owing to defections and alleged loss of support
of Chief Minister whereas the latter three had been dismissed in light of the respective State
Government's support for kar sevaks in the events leading up to the Babri Masjid demolition and
communal violence that followed.
See S.R. Bommai, (1994) 3 SCC 1, 296.
The Bommai case was decided by a majority of 6:3 on the main issue of justiciability of the
imposition of President's Rule in a State. Ahmadi, J.S. Verma, and Yogeshwar Dayal, JJ. disagreed with the majority on the point with Ahmadi, J. giving detailed reasons for disagreeing

33
34

35
36

28 NLSI REv. (2016)
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character of the Indian Constitution. Ahmadi, J. (who was in the minority on the
issue of the scope of Article 356) describes the Constitution as "quasi-federal", 37
while Sawant and Kuldip Singh, JJ. (part of the majority) did not use a specific
label in describing India's federalism, even though they held that "democracy"
and "federalism" are part of the basic structure of the Constitution. 38
Ramaswamy, J. while agreeing that federalism is a basic feature of the
Constitution, used the terms "federal" and "quasi-federal" to describe the relations of States inter se and the relations of State and Union respectively. 39 Jeevan
Reddy and Agrawal, JJ. noted that the federal character of the Constitution is not
just a "convenience" but in fact a principle born out of a "historical process" and
an understanding of the "ground realities". 40 They recognize that the federal character of the Constitution does indeed have a bias towards the Union without necessarily rendering the States mere "appendages" to the Union.4
As to what federalism actually means in the context of the Constitution of
India, the judges in the majority take different approaches to expand upon it.
Sawant and Kuldip Singh, JJ. list out eleven features of the Indian constitution
given by constitutional scholar H.M. Seervai to argue that India was a genuine
federal constitution.42 Of relevance here is this attribute of federalism which is
cited with approval:
"The view that unimportant matters were assigned to the States
cannot be sustained in face of the very important subjects
assigned to the States in List II, and the same applies to taxing powers of the States, which are made mutually exclusive
of the taxing powers of the Union so that ordinarily the States
have independent source of revenue of their own. The legislative
entries relating to taxes in List II show that the sources of revenue available to the States are substantial and would increasingly become more substantial. In addition to the exclusive
taxing powers of the States, the States become entitled either
to appropriate taxes collected by the Union or to a share in the
taxes collected by the Union".43

For Ramaswamy, J. also, the "essence of federalism" is the division of legislative and executive powers of a State between the Union and the States. He is of
the view that each is sovereign within its own sphere to the extent of the power
with the majority on the question of use of Article 356 violating the basic structure of the
Constitution.

See
See
39 See
40
See
41
See
42
See
37
38

43

S.R.
S.R.
S.R.
S.R.
S.R.
S.R.

Bommai,
Bommai,
Bommai,
Bommai,
Bommai,
Bommai,

(1994)
(1994)
(1994)
(1994)
(1994)
(1994)

3
3
3
3
3
3

SCC
SCC
SCC
SCC
SCC
SCC

1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,

75. (Ahmedi, J.).
112 (Sawant and Kuldip Singh, JJ.).
156 (Ramaswamy, J.).
215 (Jeevan Reddy and Agrawal, JJ.).
216 (Jeevan Reddy and Agrawal JJ.).
112 (Sawant and Kuldip, JJ.).

H.M. Seervai, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 301 (N.K Tripathi ed.,

4th

ed. 1994).
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that has been given to it under the Constitution.4 4 As
status of the Union and the States go, he sees them as
tive spheres, but to the extent that certain powers have
vis-h-vis the State, "Indian federalism", in his view is
Australia, Canada or the United States of America.45

105

far as the constitutional
co-equal in their respecbeen given to the Union
unlike the federalism in

Reddy and Agrawal, JJ. also state that "within the powers allotted to them,
States are supreme". They acknowledged that the Union cannot be allowed to
whittle down the power of the States through the process of interpretation of the
Constitution. At the same time, they noted that the Constitution has made the
Union more powerful than the States when it comes to certain matters, including
the matter of taxation, though this is accompanied by an obligation to turn over
a part of the tax proceeds to the States under the mechanism provided under the
Constitution. 46

All the judges in the majority acknowledged that the Indian constitution is a
federal one, and that the federal structure of the Constitution is a basic feature of
the Constitution. All of them agreed that within the constitutional spheres allotted to them, States are sovereign and constrained only by the express limitations
imposed on them by the Constitution. Sawant and Kuldip Singh, JJ. go on to
identify fiscal independence (as pointed out by Seervai) as one of the features of
federal character of the Indian Constitution, while Reddy and Agrawal, JJ. noted
that the Constitution couples the Union's greater tax powers with an obligation to
turn over some to the States. What cannot be denied from examining the majority judgments in Bommai is the conclusion that the core of the federal character
of the Indian Constitution is found in the fact that the legislative and executive
powers of the States are vested in them by the Constitution, limited only by the
Constitution itself and not the Union Government.
It is arguable that though the Supreme Court has recognized the federal character of the Constitution as a "basic feature", the ultimate basis of the decision
was the principle that judicial review can never be entirely excluded from the
decisions of constitutional functionaries. 47 Nevertheless, the extremely narrow
grounds on which President's Rule under Article 356 has been held permissible is
a reiteration of the federal character of the Constitution. These grounds are a recognition that federalism, where the Union cannot interfere in the functioning of
a State Government, is a basic feature of the Constitution and may only be abrogated for narrow, exceptional reasons, as articulated in the Constitution itself and
not at the pure discretion of the Governor or the President, acting on the advice
of the Union Government.

44

45
46
4

See S.R. Bommai, (1994) 3 SCC 1, 158 (Ramaswamy, J.).
See S.R. Bommai, (1994) 3 SCC 1, 158 (Ramaswamy, J.).
See S.R. Bommai, (1994) 3 SCC 1, 215 (Reddy & Agrawal, JJ.).
Singh, supra note 13, at 463.
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While the basis of what constitutes federalism was articulated in the context of the use of Emergency powers under Article 356, the analytical framework it provides to understand the core of what constitutes "federalism" still
holds. The consensus among constitutional law scholars is that India's federalism on the spectrum is perhaps closer to the unitary state than to a federal
polity like the United States, where far greater powers vest in the sub-national
units. 48 Nonetheless, the judicial position remains that the federal structure of the
Constitution, in so far as it divides political sovereignty between the States and
the Union, guaranteeing the independence of action of both within the spheres
allotted to them, is a basic feature that cannot be done away with by amendment.
In the specific context of taxation, the Supreme Court's judgment in State
of WB. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd.4 1 is also relevant. Here, the Supreme Court
re-iterated the powers of the State Governments in imposing taxes on mineral
rights, even though the power to regulate and control such minerals was vested
with the Union. The court read the relevant entries of List I and List II of the
Seventh Schedule harmoniously, holding that the Union's power to regulate and
control could not be said to have deprived the State of its power of taxation on
that subject. It premised this harmonious interpretation on the federal structure of
the Constitution, acknowledging that there definitely was a bias in favour of the
Union in the federal structure. The Court nonetheless states that interpretation of
the Constitution should avoid "whittling down" the powers of the State.50

'

The Supreme Court in Kesoram does not explicitly discuss whether federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution (since no constitutional amendment was
involved), but nonetheless operates on the assumption that judicial interpretation
of the Constitution must work towards reinforcing rather than weakening the federal structure of the Constitution.5
A cumulative reading of these cases suggests the following propositions:
a. Though there is a strong bias towards the Union, there is no doubt that the
Constitution of India envisages a federal polity.
b. The federal structure of the Constitution is a basic feature of the
Constitution that cannot be abrogated by amendment.
c. The division of powers between the Union and States is an essential feature of this federal character.
d. The political sovereignty of States is inviolate under the Constitution,
save for exceptional circumstances where constitutional rule is itself not
possible.
48

49
50
5

A comparison that Ahmadi J makes to say that the Indian Constitution is not "federal" in the
same sense as the American Constitution. See S.R. Bommai, (1994) 3 SCC 1, 72.
See State of WB. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201.
Kesoram Industries, (2004) 10 SCC 201, 289.
Kesoram Industries, (2004) 10 SCC 201, 289.
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e. States' power to levy taxes and cesses by laws is plenary and part of the
federal character of the Constitution.
What the 101st Amendment Act does, however, in the way in which the GST
Council is structured, is to abrogate States' political sovereignty when it comes to
the levy of taxes. As I argue in the next part, it renders States subservient to the
Union in the matter of taxation, giving the Union the power to dictate taxation
laws and the policies of a State.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY OF
THE 101st AMENDMENT ACT
A. Legal problems with GST Council
The 101st Amendment Act which creates the constitutional framework for
the GST also creates a GST Council to resolve issues of implementation. This
Council comprises of the Union Finance Minister as Chairperson, the Union
Minister for State for Finance or Revenue, and all Finance Ministers from the
respective State Governments.52 It has the power to issue "recommendations" on
a range of matters outlined in Article 279A(4) of the Constitution. Decisions of
the GST Council are taken by super-majority of three fourths of the weighted
votes of members present and voting,53 but each State and the Union don't necessarily have the same voting power. The Union alone has one-third of the votes,
while all the States together have two-thirds of the total votes."
Before getting into the two main problems with the structure of the GST
Council, it is necessary to address one issue - whether the "recommendations" of
the GST Council are in fact binding upon the Union and States.
There is scope for confusion over whether the "recommendations" of the
Council are binding, since legally, a "recommendation" (in contrast with the word
"prescription") would mean that it is non-binding on the parties concerned.
Explanation to Article 246A, Article 269A(1), clauses (4), (5) and (11) of Article
279A(4), and Section 18 of the 101st Amendment Act use the term "recommendations" or some variation of the same in the context of the GST Council. This
would suggest that the Union and the States are still free to disregard the recommendation of the GST Council if they so choose.
However, a closer examination suggests that this is not so. It is a well-accepted
canon of construction that words must interpreted in the context in which they
CONST. art. 279A. cl. 1.
CONST. art. 279A. cl. 9.

52

INDIA.

53

INDIA.

54

INDIA. CONST.

5

art. 279A. cl. 9(a).
See NaraindasIndurkhya v. State ofM.P., (1974) 4 SCC 788 where the Supreme Court made the
distinction between "recommendation" and "prescription" in the context of school syllabus.
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occur 5 6 and in line with the intent of the legislature.57 The use of "recommenda-

tion" may be an instance of poor drafting as the intent in introducing the GST
Council is quite clearly to make the recommendations binding. Two reasons can
be forwarded for this: one, if the GST Council can't make binding recommendations, the entire structure of the GST will collapse, as each State will have a
different and possibly conflicting tax levy and collection mechanism. The GST,
as envisioned, is supposed to be uniform, with second order benefits to flow
out from such uniformity. The Union Finance Minister, Mr. Arun Jaitley, in his
speech introducing the 101st Amendment Bill in the Rajya Sabha said,
The merits of the system itself are that it would convert India
into one uniform economic market with a uniform tax rate,
bring about a seamless transfer of goods and services across the
country, enable us to check evasion and, therefore, enlarge the
revenue, as far as the Centre and the States are concerned.58
The uniform rates promised by the GST would go out of the window if the
GST Council can't ensure uniformity in rates.

-

Two, the fact that there is a dispute resolution mechanism provided for in
Article 279A(11) suggests that the recommendations are supposed to be binding
if they were merely recommendatory and non-binding, no legal obligations would
arise out of them, and there would be no dispute to address as the State or the
Union would be free to disregard the recommendations. If the intent was to make
the recommendations non-binding there would be no need to have a dispute settlement body to enforce compliance of recommendations.
Given that the "recommendations" of the GST Council are actually binding on
the States, the manner in which the decisions are taken by the GST Council is
constitutionally defective for two broad reasons.
First, recommendations of the Council are made on the basis of a three
fourths majority of the members of the Council according to Article 279A(9).
However, as mentioned not all members of the Council have an equal vote in the
Council. The votes are weighted with the Union Government's vote having the
weight of one-third of the total votes cast and all the States together having twothirds of the total votes. With the requirement for majority being three-fourths of
the votes cast, this effectively gives the Centre a veto over all "recommendations"
of the Council as it is mathematically impossible to attain the required threefourths majority if the Union does not vote for it.

56

See Yedida Chakradhararaov. State ofA.P., (1990) 2 SCC 523.

5

See PratapSingh v. State ofJharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551.
Arun Jaitley, Speech to the Rajya Sabha (Aug. 3,
bate/240/03082016/14.00pmTol5.00pm.pdf.
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Considering once again the kinds of subjects that the GST Council has
the power to make binding recommendations on, it implies that the Union
Government has veto power over the law making functions of the States - a concept entirely alien to the federal structure of the Constitution of India.
Such a mechanism which allows the Union to determine and direct the tax
policies of a State through a binding "recommendation" of the Council is unlikely
to pass the "basic structure" test in that it could amount to a violation of the
Constitution's basic feature of federalism. It directly infringes and violates one of
the fundamental tenets of the Constitution's federal structure - the political sovereignty of the States.

'

Curiously, this particular feature of the GST Council is of relatively recent
vintage. The earlier version of the 101st Amendment Act, the Constitution (11 5th
Amendment) Bill, 2011 mandates that decisions of the GST Council be taken on
the basis of consensus of all parties. 59 However, this was changed on the basis of
a report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee which recommended a change
on the basis that consensus may be difficult to achieve between the Union and
the States.60 The basis for doing so is a "suggestion" made during a meeting of
the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers in 2013. However, it was
never clarified in the report if this was a suggestion made by the Empowered
Committee itself or one of the suggestions made at the meeting by a party.6
Only the view of the Chairman of the Empowered Committee of State Finance
Ministers is reproduced to this effect and it has never been made clear if this was
the decision of the Empowered Committee or his personal opinion.62 Immediately
after that the Report says that it would be preferable to have a consensus based
decision making,6 3 but in the ultimate recommendation to the Government, it suggests the present voting format.
The 115th Amendment Bill which proposes that decisions of the GST Council
be taken by consensus arguably provides for a more constitutionally appropriate method as it treats the Union and the States as equals instead of placing
one above the other. There is no logic or rationale given by anyone for why the
consensus requirement was replaced by the majority system with a veto for the
Union, save for a cursory line in the Standing Committee Report that sometimes consensus may be difficult. Even the dissent note by the member from the
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party, in the report of the Select

59

Proposed Article 279A(8) Constitution (11 5th Amendment) Bill, 2011 <http://www.prsindia.org/
uploads/media/Constitution%/20115/Constitution% o20115,%/o2022%/20of%/202011.pdf>.
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Constitution%20115/GST%/020SC%/20Report.pdf>.
Id., at 61.
STANDING COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, supra note 60, at 35.
STANDING COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, supra note 60, at 37.
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Committee considering the 101st Amendment Act in its Bill form, which criticizes
the voting structure in the GST Council, is not referred to or responded to at all.6 4
Second, the supremacy of the Union over the States in the GST Council is
re-affirmed by the manner in which disputes arising out of the recommendations
of the GST Council are resolved. The 101st Amendment Act leaves it to the GST
Council itself to set up the manner in which disputes will be resolved. The 101st
Amendment Act does not provide for any other separate procedure by which the
dispute settlement mechanism must be decided upon leaving one to conclude that
this too will be subject to the rule of super-majority, with the Union continuing to enjoy a veto over the decisions of the GST Council. In effect, the Union,
which dominates decision making in the GST Council, will also decide how these
decisions may be challenged by aggrieved States. Given its veto, it can be safely
assumed the Union will never have a grievance against any recommendation of
the GST Council and it may, at best, use this dispute settlement mechanism to
enforce the decisions of the Council against States. A State that is unhappy with
a GST Council recommendation is therefore left with little or no effective legal
remedy.
Apart from compounding the subordinate position of the States under the GST
Council, the dispute settlement mechanism could also fall afoul of the Supreme
Court's judgment in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of
India,65 where the Court struck down the Constitution (9 9th Amendment) Act,
2015 for the reason, inter alia, that the Government, which was the largest litigant had a say in the appointment of judges. 6 6 With the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over decisions of the GST Council having been excluded by implication
(specifically its jurisdiction under Article 131 in relation to inter-State or UnionState disputes), it is likely that this might be seen to be an abrogation of judicial
review under the Constitution - a basic feature that has been responsible for all
constitutional amendments struck down so far.
Irrespective of whether the Supreme Court is ultimately going to hold the
101st Amendment Act as being constitutionally valid or otherwise, the fact
remains that the GST, in order to be functional, requires a massive, coordinated
effort on the part of the Union and the States. This requires both the Union and
the States to be on the same page as regards the benefits and drawbacks of the
GST and its operation. A GST Council which is riven by distrust between parties
and suspicion about the motives of the other is unlikely to perform this coordination function with any real effect. The GST Council, as presently structured,
seems to deprive States of a real say in the decision making around the GST.
64
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B. A comparative perspective on the GST
Two federal systems which have adopted the GST, Canada and Australia,
provide interesting contrasts in terms of how the GST was incorporated into
the federal structure. Whereas Canada and Australia adopted a GST in 199167
and 200068 respectively, neither Canada nor Australia amended their respective
Constitutions to adopt the GST and it is quite interesting to examine why.

'

The Canadian example would not be particularly relevant for India since the
power to impose a GST would be entirely within the legal competence of the
federal Parliament as the Provincial Legislatures have power only to impose
direct taxes and not indirect taxes.6 9 There is no question of an incursion on
any Provincial power since the exclusive competence to enact the GST was with
the Parliament. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Goods
and Services Tax, In reo which held that Part IX of the Excise Tax Act, 1985
was constitutionally valid and did not in any way infringe the powers of the
Provincial legislatures under the Canadian Constitution. It found however that
there was some encroachment which was "necessarily incidental" but not in a
manner which affected the constitutional validity of the GST.7
More relevant for the Indian experience perhaps is the Australian Constitution,
where save for the power to impose customs and excise duty, the power to
levy taxes is concurrent between the Commonwealth and the States.72 The
GST however is levied only by the Commonwealth Government and not by
the States. This does not mean that the States have no say in the GST. On the
contrary, Section 1-3 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act,
1999 makes it clear that the Commonwealth will maintain the rate and base
for the GST in accordance with the Agreement on Principles for the Reform of
Commonwealth-State Financial Relations ("the Agreement"). Furthermore, the
same section goes on to confirm that revenue from the GST will go to the States
and the sub-national units.
The Agreement itself was entered into in 1999 and lists out what sort of taxes
are being given up by both, the Commonwealth and the States and Territories. 7 3
It also provides for a revenue sharing arrangement between the Commonwealth
and the States and territories of revenues arising out of the levy of the GST.7
By introducing part IX of the Excise Tax Act, 1985.
A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act, 1999.
69
See Sections 91 and 92, The Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982.
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Relevant in the context of India's GST structure is Part 3 which deals with the
Management of the GST Rate and the GST Base.75 Any changes to the rate or the
base have to be on the basis of the unanimous support of the State and Territory
Governments and cannot be done by the Commonwealth Government alone, even
though it has the plenary power to enact the GST legislation.
Of course the structure of the GST in both these federal nations have been
designed keeping their respective constitutional schema in mind, and it would
be hazardous to suggest that India should have adopted either of these models in
framing the GST law. More so, because the GST in India is envisaged as something which both Union and States will impose. Nonetheless, it is important to
note that the GST does not necessarily require the sub-national units to be in a
subordinate position vis-h-vis the federal government when it comes to their taxing powers. Through the introduction of the GST, States/provinces have not lost
their taxing powers or become subordinate to the Union either in Canada or in
Australia, nor do they have to exercise it in accordance with the Union's wishes.
It is not therefore a necessary requirement of a GST that the federal unit gains
control over the fiscal policies of the sub-national units.

IV. CONCLUSION
Save for a few stray articles, 76 there has not been much public debate about
the structure of the GST Council and its problems. It is likely that the issue may
come to the fore when the States actually attend a meeting of the GST Council
and realise that the voting system is stacked against them and in favour of the
Union.7 7 With the present voting structure, there is no reason for the Union to
take on board all States and it is quite likely that proposals relating to the rate of
the GST, the exemptions and collection mechanism are likely to cause much disagreement. More so, since there's already been much public disagreement between
so-called "producer States" and "consumer States" with the former taking a view
that a GST is fundamentally against their interests. 78 It is quite likely that a legal

7

Part 3 [31-2], Intergovernmental Agreement on the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial
Relations, 1999.
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challenge could arise against the GST given the lopsided structure of voting that
will leave some State aggrieved.
The legal challenge to the 101st Amendment Act, as this paper has outlined,
will not be without firm legal basis. Given the effort that it took to get thus far
on GST, it is quite unlikely that another round of constitutional amendments will
be made by the Government to rectify the legal defects in the 101st Amendment
Act pointed out here. It is quite likely that when challenged, the effort will be to
defend the amendment legally in court.
That said, the 101st Amendment Act does not entirely foreclose the possibility
of the States having a say in the decision making process in the GST Council.
The Union still needs a majority of the States present and voting to agree with
it in order to be able to take the decisions it wishes to in the context of the GST
Council. Arguably this still provides some space for States to bargain with the
Union and might save the 101st Amendment Act from being struck down.
However, this risks creating "winners" and "losers" among the States in respect
of the decisions taken by the GST Council. The "losers", the ones who may be
adversely affected by a decision of the Council, will still have no effective remedy against the decisions of the GST Council given that the same decision making structure which went against them will also decide how their grievances will
be addressed.
Whether the provisions of the 101st Amendment Act are struck down by the
Supreme Court or not, the concerns for the federal structure of the Constitution
will not go away. The success of the GST, in practice, requires high levels of
co-ordination and trust between the Union and the States. This is a task that cannot be taken for granted. The present framework raises some questions, namely:
Will States which feel that their interests have been crushed by a brute majority not try and throw further spanners into the works? Is the GST not likely to
be mired in litigation, not between the assessee and State, but between State and
State, and State and Union over the manner in which it is to be operated?
To re-iterate: India's federal character is not one of "administrative convenience" or mere accident. It is the result of specific historical circumstances leading up to the enactment of the Constitution. Indeed, as Ramaswamy J. recognized
in his judgment in Bommai, a federal government was the Constitution makers'
attempt at finding an effective way to govern a country as vast and diverse as
India.7 9 In attempting a large scale (and probably necessary) reform of indirect
taxation, it would seem as if the federal character of the Constitution has been
needlessly tampered with by the Union. If unchecked by the Court, this could
have grave repercussions for the future of India's federal polity.
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